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I.

INTRODUCTION

Antonin Scalia was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court to be a
“consensus builder.”2 In other words, he was supposed to view himself as
a member of a collegial court that worked together to create precedent. At
his confirmation hearing, Senator Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), the Chairman
of the Committee on the Judiciary, stated:
[T]hose who have been associated with Judge Scalia
throughout his life—even if they might disagree with him
philosophically—consistently describe him as: A person
who is open-minded, a consensus builder, and an individual with a keen intellect and sense of humor. These are unquestionably qualities we desire in a person who is to be
elevated to the highest court in the land.3
However, during his tenure, Justice Scalia was not a consensus
builder. Indeed, in an interview he gave with Charlie Rose in 2016, he exclaimed, “I can’t be a consensus builder”:
J. Scalia: Look, when I came on the Court, the word was,
you know, Scalia will be a consensus builder, cause I’m
such a charming fellow. I will be a consensus builder.
Rose: Is that what they said?
J. Scalia: No, they didn’t say the charming part, but they
did expect me to be a consensus builder, he you know, he
gathers the votes. I can’t be a consensus builder.

2 Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary
United
States
Senate,
99th
Cong.
1-2
(1986),
http://www.loc.gov/law/find/nominations/scalia/hearing.pdf.
3 Id. at 2.
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Rose: Because?
J. Scalia: Because I can’t trade. You see [Justice] Bill
Brennan, who was an evolutionist, he could deal. He could
go to his colleague, you know, “I want to change the Constitution this far.” And go, “God gee Bill, I can’t go this
far.” And he’d go, “well what about this far.” He can deal.
Now I can’t deal. If I’m, if I’m, doing the text, what can I
say, you know, “half way between what the text really
means and what’d you’d like it to mean?” Is that the deal
I’m going to cut?
Rose: Yes, that would be it.
J. Scalia: You can’t do it.4
Justice Clarence Thomas once made a similar statement, in which
he suggested that compromising is inconsistent with his oath of office.5
Scholars have long been aware that some conservatives subscribe
to an anti-consensus building philosophy. As one wrote: “As an ideologue,
Justice Scalia preferred his subjectively ‘correct’ answer to the most mutually agreeable answer. Justice Scalia cite[d] his adherence to originalism
and textualism as the reason for his inability to form coalitions.”6 Conservatives tend to value the “great dissenter,” who always views the resolution of a legal dispute through his or her subjective lens.7 Lest there be any
doubt that conservatives have trouble forming coalitions, the five conservative justices authored sixty separate writings this past term at the U.S. Supreme Court.8 The four liberals authored thirty-six.9 Furthermore, con-

4 Charlie Rose, Interview with Justice Antonin Scalia, CBS THIS MORNING, at 0:31–1:30
(Feb. 15, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CNPuKv_pNks.
5 Bill Kristol, Interview with Clarence Thomas, CONVERSATIONS WITH BILL KRISTOL, at
6:50–8:20 (Oct. 22, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q3rZknW5gAk&t=2330s.
6 Robert Stein, Foreword, A Consequential Justice, 101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 1, 9
(2016).
7 James Allan, One of My Favorite Judges: Constitutional Interpretation, Democracy and
Antonin Scalia, 6 BR. J. AM. LEG. STUDIES 25, 31 (2017).
8 Nina Totenberg, Emmett Witkovsky-Eldred & Alyson Hurt, In Supreme Court Term, Liberals Stuck Together While Conservatives Appeared Fractured, NPR (July 15, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/07/15/891185410/in-supreme-court-term-liberals-stuck-together-whileconservatives-appeared-fract.
9 Id.
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servative justices authored fifteen “solo” separate writings, while liberal
justices authored four.10
Of course, there have been a few famous liberal justices who were
not keen on compromise; but often, the trouble for liberals seems to be
psychological and not jurisprudential.11 In fairness, conservatives have the
same psychological roadblocks to compromise. However, unlike conservatives, liberals have not made an unwillingness to compromise an integral a
part of their judicial philosophy. Indeed, law review articles have been authored praising liberals for their ability to form coalitions.12
The problem with conservatives’ anti-consensus building philosophy is that high courts exist to develop the law.13 When members of a high
court refuse to work together, the result is often that the court has no majority opinion. This is a disservice to the public because it confuses, rather
than clarifies, the law. As Chief Justice John Roberts explained: “I think
that every justice should be worried about the Court acting as a Court and
functioning as a Court, and they should all be worried, when they’re writing separately, about the effect on the Court as an institution.”14 In the
words of several scholars, “[w]hen the Supreme Court fails to generate a
controlling precedent, the result arguably is an erosion of the Court’s credibility and authority as a source of legal leadership.”15
Conservatives’ anti-consensus building philosophy has found its
way to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, as demonstrated by a rise in decisions with no majority opinion. This Article has three goals: (1) to persuade conservative justices to abandon their anti-consensus building phiId.
See Stein, supra note 6, at 4.
12 See generally id.
13 Victor Eugene Flango, State Supreme Court Opinions as Law Development, 11 J.
APPELLATE PRAC. & PROCESS 105 (2010); Skylar Reese Croy, Comment, Step One to Recusal
Reform: Find an Alternative to the Rule of Necessity, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 623, 631–34. Notably,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court and members thereof have stated that the court serves a lawdeveloping function. See e.g., State ex rel. Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 424 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Wis.
1988) (“[I]t is this court’s function to develop and clarify the law.”); State v. Brantner, 939
N.W.2d 546, 525 (Wis. 2020) (Roggensack, C.J., concurring) (“Part of our obligation as supreme
court justices is to take complicated legal issues and decide them in a way that simplifies and explains them.”); State v. Hermann, 867 N.W.2d 772, 804–05 (Wis. 2015) (Ziegler, J., concurring)
(“Unlike a circuit court or the court of appeals, the supreme court serves a law development purpose; therefore, cases before the supreme court impact more than parties then before the court.”).
See generally Patience Drake Roggensack, Elected to Decide: Is the Decision-Avoidance Doctrine of Great Weight Deference Appropriate in this Court of Last Resort, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 541
(2006).
14 Jeffrey
Rose,
Robert’s
Rules,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Jan.–Feb.
2007),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/01/robertss-rules/305559/.
15
Pamela C. Corley et al., Extreme Dissensus: Explaining Plurality Decisions on the United
States Supreme Court, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 180, 181 (2010).
10
11
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losophy, (2) to document the problems the philosophy has caused and (3) to
propose solutions. This Article focuses on the Wisconsin Supreme Court;
although, as it notes at various points, this problematic philosophy is likely
not unique to Wisconsin’s high court.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I summarizes the history of
judicial opinion writing. This context is helpful for understanding why a
rise in decisions with no majority is a threat to the legitimacy of the judiciary. Part II documents the rise in opinions without a majority and argues it
largely stems from the addition to the bench of conservatives with an anticonsensus building philosophy. Part III addresses consequences of this
trend. Most importantly, and most obviously, the increase in decisions
with no majority opinion indicates a failure of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court to perform its law-developing function. There are less intuitive problems as well. These problems primarily affect conservative jurisprudence,
and their existence indicates that some conservatives ought to rethink their
anti-consensus building philosophy. Part IV discusses possible solutions.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON JUDICIAL OPINION
WRITING
This Part summarizes the history of judicial opinion writing. This
history is helpful for understanding why majority opinions are so important. It also discusses the concept of a collegial court. Indeed, this concept developed because an inability to author majority opinions threatened
the legitimacy of the judiciary.
A.

Opinion Writing in England

English courts had long utilized seriatim opinions at the time of
America’s founding. “Seriatim” means, “[o]ccuring in a series.”16 In the
context of judicial opinions, “seriatim opinions” are “a series of opinions
written individually by each judge on the bench, as opposed to a single
opinion speaking fort the court as a whole.”17 Professor M. Todd Henderson, of the University of Chicago Law School, explains: “For almost a
thousand years, decisions of multimember courts in England were delivered orally by each judge seriatim and without any prior intracourt consultation.”18 This “long and unbroken tradition” temporarily changed when
Seriatim, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Id.
18
M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent,
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 292.
16
17
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William Murray (later known as Lord Mansfield) became Lord Chief Justice in 1756.19 He “introduced a procedure for generating agreement and
consensus among judges and then issuing caucused opinions.”20 In essence, Lord Mansfield created what scholars today would call a “collegial
court.”21 “The judges met collectively in the secrecy of their chambers,
worked out their differences into compromise decisions, and then wrote
what was to be delivered as an anonymous and unanimous ‘opinion of the
court.’”22 Lord Mansfield hoped that his approach would bring clarity to
English commercial law, which had become extremely complicated.23
Alas, his practice was abandoned shortly after his retirement.24 Only recently has Lord Mansfield’s approach returned to England.25
B.

Opinion Writing in the United States

England’s legal traditions—including its use of seriatim opinions—became norms in colonial America.26 Importantly, many courts had
been operating before Lord Mansfield’s innovations, so it should not be
surprising that they did not follow his approach.27 Over time, courts were
inspired by Lord Mansfield, but his ideas were controversial.28 The first
court to abandon seriatim opinions was the Virginia Supreme Court under
the leadership of Chief Judge Edmund Pendleton.29 Notably, Chief Judge
Pendleton was condemned by the likes of Thomas Jefferson, who saw the
practice as illegitimate.30 Jefferson believed that seriatim opinions increased transparency and made individual judges accountable.31 Lord
Mansfield’s approach was abandoned in Virginia when Chief Judge Pendleton’s successor took his seat, in part due to Jefferson’s efforts.32

Id. at 294.
Id.
21 See infra Section I.B.
22 Henderson, supra note 18, at 294.
23 See id.
24 Id. at 302.
25 Id. at 303.
26 Id. at 303–04.
27 Henderson, supra note 18, at 304.
28 Id. at 308.
29 Joshua M. Austin, Comment, The Law of Citations and Seriatim Opinions: Were the Ancient Romans and the Early Supreme Court on the Right Track?, 31 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 19, 27
(2010).
30 See id.
31
Id. at 28.
32 Id. at 27.
19
20
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Despite the controversy, American courts soon became aware that
they needed to consider Lord Mansfield’s approach, or they risked being
the weakest branch of government. For example, many early U.S. Supreme
Court decisions were issued as seriatim opinions.33 The Court was attacked
by the other branches and the press, in part because of its inability to pronounce law in a clear manner; indeed, the nation’s first Chief Justice, John
Jay, left the Court and refused to return because he believed that the Court
was unable to earn the “public confidence and respect.”34 Calder v. Bull35
is a “classic” example of the confusion resulting from seriatim opinions.36
Four justices participated and each authored an opinion. To this day,
scholars debate the holding of this case.37
The Court’s practice of seriatim opinions was ended by none other
than Chief Justice John Marshall.38 He looked closely to the example of
Lord Mansfield.39 Based on that example, Chief Justice Marshall established the practice of “opinions of the court.”40 Scholars credit Chief Justice Marshall’s decision with making the judiciary a co-equal branch of
government.41 State courts soon followed suit.
Notably, Chief Justice Marshall’s practice differed from the practice in use today. He normally delivered the opinions for the Court; his colleagues did not.42 This is why a large number of opinions appear to have
been “authored” by Chief Justice Marshall.43 It took time for the modern
practice of individual justices authoring opinions on behalf of the Court to
evolve. However, the central idea of Chief Justice Marshall has always
remained: “each generation of the Court [has] adopted Chief Justice Marshall’s belief that a unified voice [i]s necessary and practicable for the sur-

33 Henderson, supra note 18, at 308; see also John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices
of the United States Supreme Court 1790–1940, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 137, 140 (1999).
34 Henderson, supra note 18, at 308.
35 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
36 Henderson, supra note 18, at 308.
37 Id. (quoting DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS, 1789–1888, at 44, 45, 55 (1985)) (explaining that the “practice of seriatim
opinions” creates difficulties in determining the holding of Calder, that “Calder illustrates the
uncertainty that can arise when each Justice writes separately” and that the “practice of seriatim
opinions . . . weakened the force of the [Court’s] decisions”).
38 Id. at 313.
39 See id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42
Kelsh, supra note 33, at 141.
43 Id. at 144.

8

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY [Vol. XXVI

vival and growth of the republic.”44 As Chief Justice Marshall alluded to,
high courts are legitimated by their collegial nature; it is what gives the judiciary its status as a co-equal branch of government. Furthermore, the rule
of law cannot thrive when the law is unclear.45
Collegiality furthers the rule of law not only by making law clear,
but by giving its interpretation a sense of objectivity.46 A high court’s ability to declare law extends beyond the sum-total of its members’ subjective
views—in a sense, a majority opinion represents an objective view of law
that can be achieved only by the work of an institution. Stated otherwise,
the “correct” view of the law is not merely the sum-total of the subjective
views of the members of the court—it is something else altogether. Today,
high courts in the United States are viewed as collegial bodies.47 High
courts have the power to declare law—individual justices do not. The role
of a judge on a collegial court requires judges to work with others. Two
New York University professors developed a useful illustration to demonstrate what judges on a collegial court are not.48 They explained that in
gymnastics, each judge scores the performer by giving him or her a numerical number. The numbers are then added. The score given to the performer is, in essence, an average of the score assigned by each individual
judge. Indeed, the result might not be considered credible if the judges
communicated ahead of time.49 Judging on a collegial court does not work
in such a manner. It is a different sort of judging. In the words of the two
scholars, it is a “team enterprise” in which “collaboration and deliberation
are the trademarks.”50
The language of opinions reflects the view that courts are collegial
bodies. Majority opinions do not say “I decide the case this way,” they say,
“we decide this case this way.”51 In the words of one Wyoming Supreme
Court justice:
A majority opinion is the product of a collegiate court and,
when circulated for consideration by the other members of
44 Adam S. Hochschild, Note, The Modern Problem of Supreme Court Plurality Decision:
Interpretation in Historical Context, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 261, 273 (2000).
45 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (plurality) (“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”).
46 See generally Meg Penrose, Goodbye to Concurring Opinions, 15 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 25 (2020).
47 See generally Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawerence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in the Collegial Courts, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1993).
48 Id. at 4.
49 Id.
50
Id. at 4–5.
51 Id. at 7.

2021]

DEMISE OF THE LAW-DEVELOPING FUNCTION

9

the court, or, at least, when filed, it no longer retains any
proprietary aspect so far as the drafter is concerned. It becomes an institutional product that is owned only by the
court.52
For this reason, the views represented in a majority opinion do not
necessarily reflect the views of its author; they reflect the views of the
court. The majority author may have drafted the opinion quite differently if
he or she was unconstrained by the concerns of his or her colleagues. To
be clear, there is nothing inherently wrong with separate writings. They are
not inconsistent with a high court’s collegial nature. A quality separate
writing improves the deliberative process.53 It is for this reason that Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist objected when critics suggested that he had
an obligation to persuade his fellow justices to issue fewer separate writings.54 The problem is not with separate writings generally; it is with the
proliferation of separate writings at the expense of majority opinions.
III. THE RISE IN LEAD AND MAJORITY/LEAD OPINIONS AT THE
WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has forgotten the lessons of Lord
Mansfield and Chief Justice Marshall. It is not operating as a collegial
court. To a significant degree, this Part builds on the work of Professor
Alan Ball, who teaches history at Marquette University. He has spent
many years running a blog that provides empirical data on the Wisconsin
Supreme Court,55 and he has kindly allowed his raw data to be utilized for
this Article. This Part first discusses the terminology used to signal that an
opinion does not have the support of a majority. It then documents the rise
in decisions with no majority opinion and argues that it is largely because
of conservatives with an anti-consensus building philosophy joining the
court.

52 Engberg v. Meyers, 820 P.2d 70, 170 (Wy. 1991) (Macy, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
53 Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 47, at 9.
54 See generally William H. Rehnquist, “All Discord, Harmony Not Understood”: The Performance of the Supreme Court of the United States, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 973 (1980).
55 Alan Ball, SCOWSTATS, http://www.scowstats.com/.
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A.

The Definition of a Plurality, Lead and Majority/Lead Opinion

Understanding the rise in decisions with no majority opinion requires understanding some vocabulary. The terminology used to signal that
the first opinion does not have the support of a majority varies. Black’s
Law Dictionary defines a “plurality opinion” as “[a]n opinion lacking
enough judges’ votes to constitute a majority but receiving more votes than
any other opinion.”56 However, whether a plurality opinion needs to receive the most votes is unclear. A more accurate definition might be that a
plurality opinion is an opinion that received fewer votes than a majority,
but received the most votes of the opinions that agreed with the mandate.57
A dissent, for example, could have more votes than any other opinion; in
such a case, the first opinion might still be labeled a plurality. Members of
the U.S. Supreme Court have often used the phrase “plurality” opinion.58
Sometimes, they have used the phrase “lead” opinion to refer to the first
opinion if the first opinion did not receive more votes than any other opinion.59 Lead opinions are so-named because they come before other writings, such as concurrences and dissents.
Members of the Wisconsin Supreme Court occasionally have used
the phrase plurality opinion;60 however, more often, they have used the
phrase lead opinion even if the first opinion garnered more votes than any
other.61 Notably, Wisconsin is not the only state to refer to such opinions
as lead opinions.62 The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s Internal Operating
Procedures say little about lead opinions but provide insight into their origins. As Justice Shirley Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley
summarized:

Plurality opinion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Nina Varsava, The Role of Dissents in the Formation of Precedent, 14 DUKE J. CONST. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 294 (2019).
58 See e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (plurality);
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality); Albright v. Oliver,
510 U.S. 266 (1994); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality).
59 For example, in Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., the Court’s first opinion, authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, garnered three votes, and a concurrence by Justice Scalia
also garnered three votes. 553 U.S. 181 (2008). The justices referred to Justice Stevens’ opinion
as the lead opinion.
60 State v. Deadwiller, 834 N.W.2d 362, 379 (Wis. 2013) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
61 For example, in State v. Lopez, the first opinion, authored by Justice Annette Ziegler, was
joined in full by three justices, more than any other opinion. 936 N.W.2d 125 (Wis. 2019). A
concurrence by Justice Rebecca Bradley referred to it as a lead opinion.
62 See Turner v. CertainTeed Corp., 119 N.E.3d 1260 (Ohio 2018).
56
57
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The phrase “lead opinion” is not . . . defined in our Internal
Operating Procedures or elsewhere in the case law. Our
Internal Operating Procedures (IOPs) refer to “lead opinions,” but only in stating that if, during the process of circulating and revising opinions, “the opinion originally circulated as the majority opinion does not garner the vote of
a majority of the court, it shall be referred to in separate
writings as the ‘lead opinion.’” Wis. S. Ct. IOP II.G.4.63
To summarize, sometimes a justice is assigned to draft a majority
opinion, and the justice’s draft fails to garner the support of a majority.
The draft is then referred to as a lead opinion.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s past practice helps further clarify
the nature of a lead opinion. First, a lead opinion states the mandate of the
court; however, under unusual circumstances, the reasoning in the lead
opinion could be at odds with the mandate.64 For example, in State v.
Lynch,65 the mandate was: “As a result of a divided court, the law remains
as the court of appeals has articulated it.”66 The analysis of the lead opinion, which had the support of three justices, explained that they would have
reversed the Court of Appeals. Second, a lead opinion does not always
have the most votes of the opinions agreeing with the mandate. Indeed, a
draft initially circulated as a majority opinion that later becomes a lead
opinion draft is likely to be published as the “lead opinion”—even if a concurring opinion garners more votes. This is so because of deadlines and
internal court politics; time constraints may not permit an opinion that was
written to read as a response to a lead opinion to be rewritten. An example
of such a case is State v. Outlaw.67 The lead opinion had the support of
three justices while two concurring opinions each had the support of the
remaining four justices.
The phrase “lead opinion” can be misleading because, sometimes,
a portion of an opinion garners the votes of a majority. Some members of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court have referred to such opinions, in their entirety, as lead opinions. Others have referred to the portions of the opinion
that garnered less than a majority as a lead opinion while referring to the
portions that garnered a majority as a majority opinion. Others have used

State v. Lynch, 885 N.W.2d 89, 125 (Wis. 2016) (Abrahamson & A.W. Bradley, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
64 Id.
65 885 N.W.2d at 89 (lead).
66
Id. at 89.
67 321 N.W.2d 145 (Wis. 1982) (lead).
63
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the phrase “majority/lead” opinion. For example, in State v. Lopez,68 Justice Rebecca Bradley’s concurrence referred to the first opinion as a lead
opinion, even though most of the opinion had the support of a majority.69
Contrarily, Justice Daniel Kelly’s concurrence referred to the first opinion
as a majority opinion.70 In Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue,71 the first opinion was referred to as a lead opinion in Justice Annette
Ziegler’s concurrence, although when she cited those portions that garnered
a majority, she used the phrase “majority opinion.”72 Justice Michael Gableman’s concurrence referred to the first opinion in a similar manner.73
Because portions of the first opinions in Lopez and Tetra Tech garnered a
majority, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley’s dissent in Lopez and her concurrence in Tetra Tech referred to the respective first opinions as a “majority/lead” opinion.74 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley has used the phrase “majority/lead” opinion in other writings.75 This phrase is helpful because it
signals that some parts of the opinion are precedential, and others are not.
B.

Documenting the Rise in Lead and Majority/Lead Opinions

Justice Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley noted the rise
in lead opinions during the 2015–16 term, although they did not quantify it.
In one separate writing, they stated, “[t]he proliferation of separate writings
(as in this case) and ‘lead opinions’ is emblematic of the court’s work this
‘term’ (September 2015 to June 2016).”76 They noted:
Although we have not done a statistical analysis, our perception is that few of the court’s decisions this term have
been unanimous without any separate writings, and several, including this case, have begun with “lead opinions.”
See, e.g., Singh v. Kemper, 2016 WI 67, 371 Wis.2d 127,
936 N.W.2d 125 (Wis. 2019) (majority/lead).
Id. at 173 (R. Bradley, J., concurring).
70 Id. at 179 (Kelly, J., concurring).
71 914 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 2018).
72 Compare id. at 67 (Ziegler, J., concurring) (“I concur and write separately because the
analysis that the lead opinion employs to reach its conclusion is concerning.”), with id. (citing the
“Majority op.”).
73 Compare id. at 74 (Gableman, J., concurring) (referring to the first opinion as a “lead opinion”), with id. at n.2 (joining “parts of the majority opinion”).
74 See Lopez, 936 N.W.2d at 180 (A.W. Bradley, J., dissenting); see also Tetra Tech, 914
N.W.2d at 63 (A.W. Bradley, J., concurring).
75 State v. Coffee, 937 N.W.2d 579, 597 n.1 (Wis. 2020) (A.W. Bradley, J., dissenting).
76
State v. Lynch, 885 N.W.2d 89, 125 (Wis. 2016) (Abrahamson & A.W. Bradley, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
68
69
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883 N.W.2d 86 (lead op. of Ann Walsh Bradley, J., joined
by Abrahamson, J.); Lands’ End, Inc. v. City of Dodgeville, 2016 WI 64, 370 Wis.2d 500, 881 N.W.2d 702 (lead
op. of Abrahamson, J., joined by Ann Walsh Bradley, J.,
and Gableman, J.); Coyne v. Walker, 2016 WI 38, 368
Wis.2d 444, 879 N.W.2d 520 (lead op. of Gableman, J.
with Abrahamson, J., Ann Walsh Bradley, J., and Prosser,
J., each concurring separately); State v. Smith, 2016 WI
23, 367 Wis.2d 483, 878 N.W.2d 135 (lead op. of
Roggensack, C.J., joined by Prosser, J., and Gableman, J.);
United Food & Comm. Workers Union, Local 1473 v.
Hormel Foods Corp., 2016 WI 13, 367 Wis.2d 131, 876
N.W.2d 99 (lead op. of Abrahamson, J., joined by Ann
Walsh Bradley, J.); Hoffer Props., LLC v. DOT, 2016 WI
5, 366 Wis.2d 372, 874 N.W.2d 533 (lead op. of Gableman, J., joined by Roggensack, C.J., and Ziegler, J.).77
Empirical data leaves little doubt that they were correct.
Professor Ball has documented a rise in “fractured opinions” dating
back to 1996.78 A fractured opinion may be either a lead or majority/lead
opinion. Indeed, in the terms from 1996–97 through 2014–15, a mere 2.3
percent of decisions issued by the Wisconsin Supreme Court were fractured.79 From the 2015–16 term on, over 9.5 percent of opinions issued
each term, on average, have been fractured. The dramatic rise is shown below in Figure 1.80

Id.
Alan Ball, A Spike in Fractured Decisions, SCOWSTATS (May 30, 2017),
http://www.scowstats.com/2017/05/30/a-spike-in-fractured-decisions/.
79 Id.
80 The data was compiled by Professor Ball with the exception of the data from the 2019–20
term. Note that Professor Ball excluded summary per curiam decisions from his data. For consistency, the same was done for data from the 2019–20 term. Recently, Professor Ball stated:
77
78

I settled on counting cases with “lead opinions” or “plurality opinions”—as opposed to
“majority opinions”—thinking that sufficient to identify instances where the court
could not assemble a majority to agree on a rationale. Yet, I was never entirely comfortable with this approach, because it excluded deadlocked per curiam decisions,
which are at least as fractured (and of no precedential value) as any other decision in
this category.
Alan Ball, The 2019–20 Term: Some More Impressions, SCOWSTATS (July 27, 2020),
http://www.scowstats.com/2020/07/27/the-2019-20-term-some-more-impressions/.
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Notably, Figure 1 does not account for several opinions that could
be described as fractured but that do not fit within the label of “lead” or
“majority/lead.” For example, in Bartlett v. Evers,81 an important partial
veto case, the court issued a per curiam opinion announcing the mandate.
Chief Justice Roggensack authored the first opinion that followed the per
curiam opinion, which was a partial concurrence and partial dissent.82 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley’s partial concurrence and partial dissent followed,
and it was joined by Justice Rebecca Dallet.83 The third authored opinion
was a partial concurrence and partial dissent by Justice Kelly, and it was
joined by Justice Rebecca Bradley.84 The last authored opinion was a concurrence by Justice Brian Hagedorn, and it was joined by Justice Ziegler.85
No justice signed the per curiam opinion in Bartlett, so it was not a lead
opinion; therefore, it was not counted as a fractured opinion in Figure 1.
However, there can be little doubt that it is an important example of a fractured court.
SEIU v. Vos86 is another example of an opinion that arguably represents a fractured court. In SEIU, the Wisconsin Supreme Court announced
its mandate in two majority opinions. Like Bartlett, SEIU did not have a

81
82
83
84
85
86

945 N.W.2d 685 (Wis. 2020) (per curiam).
Id. at 688 (Roggensack, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id. at 710 (A.W. Bradley, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id. at 719 (Kelly, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id. at 740 (Hagedorn, J., concurring).
946 N.W.2d 35 (Wis. 2020).
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lead opinion; however, having the mandate announced by two different majorities reflects divide. A third example is State v. Roberson.87 For context, Roberson discussed whether social science could be used to formulate
a rule of constitutional law. A majority of the court said that it cannot.
Two paragraphs in the first opinion read:
Historically, there have been times when social science
has been used by courts as an excuse to justify disturbing
decisions. Indeed, entire law review articles and book
chapters have been dedicated to analyzing how Plessy v.
Ferguson and the line of cases that followed Plessy
grounded their decisions in the social science of the time.
E.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation
Before Brown, 1985 Duke L.J. 624. . . .
The United States Supreme Court cited social science
in Brown, but it did so as a response to social science employed at the time of Plessy. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 494 n.11, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). . . .
The Court stated, “[w]hatever may have been the extent of
psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson,
this finding [of negative psychological impact] is amply
supported by modern authority.” Id.88
Justice Rebecca Bradley wrote a concurrence to state:
I join the majority opinion in full, except to the extent paragraphs 41–42 [the quoted material above] suggest that
courts may consult social science research to interpret the
Constitution. Historically, when courts contaminate constitutional analysis with then-prevailing notions of what is
“good” for society, the rights of the people otherwise guaranteed by the text of the Constitution may be trampled.89
Her concurrence was joined by Justice Kelly, which means that, in
a sense, two paragraphs of the first opinion did not have a majority. Justice
Rebecca Bradley’s concurrence was probably unnecessary. The first sentence of paragraph 41 read, “[h]istorically, there have been times when social science has been used by courts as an excuse to justify disturbing deci87
88
89

935 N.W.2d 813 (Wis. 2019).
Id. at 207.
Id. at 223 (R. Bradley, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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sions.”90 There was little disagreement of any significance on the use of
social science, and the concurrence may breed confusion.
If Bartlett, SEIU, and Roberson are added to the number of lead
and majority/lead opinions issued during the 2019–20 term, the percentage
of decisions with fractured opinions rises to over 19 percent.91 The empirical data in Figure 1, while demonstrating a significant problem, does not
paint the full picture. The problem is even worse. A fifty-state survey of
fractured opinions demonstrates the magnitude of Wisconsin’s problem.
From 2009 through 2019, most state high courts issued approximately one
to two fractured opinions per year. In contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court has issued twenty-six fractured opinions since the start of the 2015–
16 term. Although this problem is not unique to Wisconsin, Wisconsin has
experienced an extreme version of it.
The U.S. Supreme Court is experiencing a rise like the Wisconsin
Supreme Court; however, the rise at the U.S. Supreme Court is less novel.
One study noted a slight rise in plurality decisions at the U.S. Supreme
Court between 1953 and 2006, although the rise was not too pronounced.92
Another study noted that the U.S. Supreme Court issued 45 plurality decisions between 1801 and 1955 compared to 195 plurality decisions between
1953 and 2006.93 A third study found 41 plurality decisions between the
2007 and 2016 terms.94
C.

Hypotheses that May Be Disregarded

Before discussing what has caused the rise, it is worth considering
what has not triggered it. Various hypotheses have been proposed regarding why the U.S. Supreme Court has experienced a rise. Whatever merit
these hypotheses may have in regard to the U.S. Supreme Court, they are
not the problem in Wisconsin.

Id. at 207 (majority).
This percentage includes summary per curiam decisions in the denominator but not the
numerator (9 divided by 47). If the two summary per curiam decisions are assumed to be fractured, the percentage increases to over 23 percent (11 divided by 47).
92 Corley et al., supra note 15, at 181.
93 James F. Spriggs II & David R. Stras, Explaining Plurality Decisions, 99 GEO. L.J. 515,
519 (2011).
94 Varsava, supra note 57, at 292–93.
90
91
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Increasing Complexity and Controversy

One hypothesis for the rise in lead and majority/lead opinions
might be that cases are becoming more complex and controversial. Commentators have noted that the U.S. Supreme Court tends to issue plurality
decisions in significant cases.95 As one student note stated, “[m]any plurality decisions address fundamental—or even politically charged—legal issues.”96 An often-cited example is Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey.97 The decision reaffirmed a woman’s right to procure an
abortion.98
Surprisingly, lead and majority/lead opinions at the Wisconsin Supreme Court often issue in cases that present relatively simple and noncontroversial questions. The Wisconsin Supreme Court issued six lead and
majority/lead opinions during the 2019–20 term. None were in cases that
should have been particularly stirring. Lopez was a statutory interpretation
case, wherein the court concluded that multiple acts of retail theft could be
aggregated into a single charge.99 Marathon County v. D.K.100 was a typical mental commitment case, wherein the court concluded that the expiration of a mental commitment order did not moot an appeal because the appellant was still not allowed to own a firearm; however, the court also
concluded that the appellant was dangerous such that the order was properly issued.101 State v. Coffee I102 was a sentencing dispute. Lang v. Lions
Club of Cudahy Wisconsin, Inc.103 dealt with the definition of agent within
the context of Wisconsin’s recreational immunity statute. State v. Coffee
II104 analyzed whether a search incident to a lawful arrest for operating
while intoxicated could encompass a search of the vehicle’s passenger
compartment. State v. Muth105 was a criminal restitution case, wherein the
court concluded that a civil settlement agreement could not bar liability for
See id.; see also Pamela C. Corley, Uncertain Precedent: Circuit Court Responses to Supreme Court Plurality Opinions, 37 AM. POL. RES. 30, 32 (2009); John F. Davis & William L.
Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59, 80–
81 (1974).
96 James A. Bloom, Note, Plurality and Precedence: Judicial Reasoning, Lower Courts, and
the Meaning of United States v. Winstar Corp., 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1373, 1374 (2008).
97 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality).
98 Id.
99 State v. Lopez, 936 N.W.2d 125, 127 (Wis. 2019) (majority/lead).
100 937 N.W.2d 901 (Wis. 2020) (majority/lead).
101 Id. at 903.
102 State v. Coffee, 937 N.W.2d 579 (Wis. 2020) (majority/lead).
103 939 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. 2020) (lead).
104
943 N.W.2d 845 (Wis. 2020) (lead).
105 945 N.W.2d 645 (Wis. 2020) (lead).
95

18

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY [Vol. XXVI

restitution and analyzed the intersection of marital property and restitution.
While every case the Wisconsin Supreme Court decides is important, none
of these cases should have been particularly controversial. They did not,
for example, deal with hotly-debated political issues. Seemingly, justices
are not just disagreeing on relatively complex and controversial cases. They
are disagreeing on cases that are quite ordinary.106
2.

Increasing Opinion Length

Similarly, commentators have been quick to discuss fractured opinions and opinion length as if there is a correlation—maybe even a causation.107 The hypothesis seems to be closely related to the hypothesis that
cases are becoming more complicated. Chief Justice Roberts has questioned whether some of the most important cases in U.S. history could have
been decided had the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court not been willing to
author short opinions. He cites Brown v. Board of Education108 to illustrate
his point:
Keep in mind, I don’t know how many people could guess
how long the opinion was in Brown v. Board of Education.
It was less than 10 pages. You think it is this great decision—it is—probably the greatest decision of the Supreme
Court since Marbury v. Madison. It was 10 pages because
Warren knew that if he wrote another sentence, the unanimous consensus he had would start to fall apart.109
Intuitively, the longer an opinion, the more room for disagreement.
Shorter opinions may further the collegial interest of a high court.110 HowOf course, sometimes lead and majority/lead opinions issue in complex and controversial
cases. For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ended great weight deference to administrative agencies’ interpretations of law in Tetra Tech, which involved a majority/lead opinion. See
914 N.W.2d 921 (Wis. 2018) (majority/lead).
107 SCOW, the Boss, and Justice Hagedorn, ON POINT: WIS. ST. PUB. DEFENDERS (Aug. 4,
2020), http://www.wisconsinappeals.net/on-point-by-the-wisconsin-state-public-defender/scowthe-boss-and-justicehagedorn/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+wisconsinappeal
s%2FfXYi+%28On+Point%29.
108 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
109 Interview with Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE
(Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TuZEKlRgDEg.
110 Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 807–08
(1982). Of course, shorter opinions cannot become “skeletal opinions.” See, id. In the words of
Judge Frank Easterbrook, “a complete statement of the Court’s rationale, of all major and minor
106
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ever, according to Professor Ball, the length of the average opinion has not
varied much at the Wisconsin Supreme Court over the past decade.111 Furthermore, the average fractured opinion issued during the 2019–20 term
was shorter than the average first opinion. The average first opinion was
about twenty-seven pages; the average fractured opinion was about twentyfive pages. While efforts to decrease page length might help reduce the
number of lead and majority/lead opinions, opinion length does not seem to
be the cause.
3.

Increasing Caseload

Another hypothesis might be that the caseload of the court has increased. In the 1970s, some scholars suggested that the rise in plurality
opinions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court was caused by its increasing
caseload, which was thought to take away from time that could have been
spent “resolving differences.”112 But the caseload of the Wisconsin Supreme Court has not increased. Indeed, in the late 90s and early 2000s, the
court heard almost double the number of cases compared to recent terms.
D.

The Cause

Professor Ball has indicated that the dramatic increase in lead and
majority/lead opinions may be attributable to a divide between conservative
justices.113 This is the most persuasive hypothesis because the increase correlates with two conservative justices joining the court, Justice Rebecca
Bradley and Justice Kelly. For context, Justice Rebecca Bradley joined the
court early in the 2015–16 term, and Justice Kelly joined the court at the
start of the 2016–17 term. Notably, Justice Kelly’s term recently ended;
however, another conservative has joined the court: Justice Hagedorn.
These justices—supposedly—are or were a part of a majority conservative
bloc of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.114 However, the statistics do not
premises necessary to the decision, or of the limits of the holding may be invaluable. The more
the Court says, the more help it offers in planning.” Id. Skeletal opinions are also a threat to a
high court’s law-developing function. See id. at 808.
111 See Ball, supra note 78.
112 Davis & Reynolds, supra note 95, at 77.
113 Ball, supra note 78 (“[I]t is difficult to imagine the growing share of fractured decisions
without justices authoring or joining separate opinions more frequently than they did just a few
years ago. And here, the addition of Justices Kelly and R. Bradley may be as significant as the
widening stream of concurrences and dissents flowing form the offices of the court’s two liberals.”).
114
According to the media, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had five conservative members,
who acted as a bloc, during the 2019–20 term. See e.g., Wis. Democracy Campaign, Special In-
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demonstrate a conservative bloc at all. Rather, they demonstrate a conservative divide. The number of separate writings by these three justices is
enormous. Table 1 is a breakdown of separate writings during the 2019–20
term.115
Table 1: Breakdown of Separate Writings During the 2019–20 Term

Justice
Ann Walsh
Bradley
Roggensack
Ziegler
Rebecca
Bradley
Kelly
Dallet
Hagedorn

Number of
Concurrences

Number of
Dissents

Number of
Concurrence/
Dissents

Total
Writings

Number of
Withdraws
/Do Not
Participate

1

4

1

6

5

3
2

2
1

2
0

7
3

0
0

8

7

1

16

0

7
3
5

1
8
7

3
1
1

11
12
13

1
2
9

Table 1 shows that members of the supposed conservative bloc
write separately even more than the two supposed liberal justices—Justice
Ann Walsh Bradley and Justice Dallet. Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and
Justice Dallet, combined, authored 18 separate writings. Justice Rebecca
Bradley and Justice Kelly authored 27, despite being a part of the bloc that
supposedly controls the court. Justice Hagedorn, who did not participate in
9 cases, wrote separately on 13 occasions. In contrast, two members of the
supposed conservative bloc, Chief Justice Roggensack and Justice Ziegler,
authored a mere 10 separate writings combined.
Curiously, every lead and majority/lead opinion issued during the
2019–20 term was authored by either Chief Justice Roggensack or Justice
Ziegler. In each of the six cases, one or more of the members of the supposed conservative bloc authored a separate writing. In Lopez, both Justice
terests Battle on High Court Case, URBAN MILWAUKEE (May 5, 2020, 1:08 PM),
https://urbanmilwaukee.com/2020/05/05/special-interests-battle-on-high-court-case/;
Linda
Greenhouse, Opinion, The Supreme Court Fails Us, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/09/opinion/wisconsin-primary-supreme-court.html; Wisconsin
GOP Will Ask U.S. Supreme Court to Block Extended Absentee Voting, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 4,
2020), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-04-04/wisconsin-gop-vows-supremecourt-appeal-on-extended-voting.
115
Table 1 does not account for two summary per curiam decisions issued in the 2019–20
term.
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Rebecca Bradley and Justice Kelly authored concurrences.116 In both Marathon County and Lang, Justice Rebecca Bradley filed a concurring opinion
joined by Justice Kelly.117 In Coffee I, Justice Kelly concurred and Justice
Rebecca Bradley joined his concurrence in part as well as a dissent by Justice Ann Walsh Bradley.118 In Coffee II, Justice Kelly authored a concurrence and Justice Rebecca Bradley joined a dissent authored by Justice Dallet.119 In Muth, Justice Kelly concurred in part and dissent in part, Justice
Hagedorn dissented and Justice Rebecca Bradley joined a concurrence by
Justice Dallet.120
The disunity of the supposed conservative bloc cannot be explained
by reference to the personality of its members. The reason for the disunity
is a matter of jurisprudence and not psychology. The disunity reflects a
philosophical position, held by some members of the supposed bloc, that
their role does not permit compromise.
Notably, the theory that conservatives are struggling to work together does not hold for all jurisdictions experiencing the problem of fractured opinions. Washington has a very liberal court, and yet, it is highly
fractured. There are likely different causes depending on the jurisdiction.
This Article is merely a case study of one jurisdiction, and additional research is needed to understand the larger phenomenon.
IV. PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE RISE OF FRACTURED
OPINIONS
This Part explains why the rise in fractured opinions is problematic. Generally, they are confusing—a problem for everybody. There are
harms, however, specific to conservative jurisprudence related to the rise in
lead and majority/lead opinions. At the Wisconsin Supreme Court, fractured opinions tend to occur because conservatives cannot compromise and
that places conservative jurisprudence at a disadvantage: the supposedly
conservative court struggles to make conservative law. Additionally, “minority vote pooling,” a concept that conservatives have fought against, has
recently reappeared as a matter of popular discussion because of fractured
opinions. Minority vote pooling would allow justices that disagree with the
majority on an issue to cobble together with members of a different minori-

State v. Lopez, 936 N.W.2d 125 (Wis. 2019) (majority/lead).
Marathon County v. D.K., 937 N.W.2d 901 (Wis. 2020) (majority/lead); Lang v. Lions
Club of Cudahy Wis., Inc., 939 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. 2020) (lead).
118 State v. Coffee, 937 N.W.2d 579 (Wis. 2020) (majority/lead).
119
State v. Coffee, 943 N.W.2d 845 (Wis. 2020) (lead).
120 State v. Muth, 945 N.W.2d 645 (Wis. 2020) (lead).
116
117
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ty to produce a mandate. For example, a case could have four issues. As to
each issue, there could be a majority in favor of affirming the lower court.
However, if one justice believes that the court should reverse on the first
issue, and another on the second, and so on, there could be four justices that
believe the lower court should be reserved.121 Minority vote pooling leads
to bizarre results.
This Part begins by examining how Wisconsin law treats lead and
majority/lead opinions. The confusing nature of these opinions cannot be
fully appreciated otherwise. Furthermore, one proposed solution to the
problematic nature of these opinions could be the adoption of the Marks
rule. But understanding why the Wisconsin Supreme Court has not already
adopted the Marks rule lessens the persuasive force of this idea. The problem must be addressed by decreasing the number of lead and majority/lead
opinions.
A.

Lead and Majority/Lead Opinions Under Wisconsin Law

Notably, Wisconsin law differs from federal law in its handling of
fractured opinions. As explained previously, the U.S. Supreme Court uses
the term “plurality.” In Marks v. United States,122 the Court instructed that
a case with a plurality opinion can have precedential value “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on
the narrowest grounds . . . .’”123 Under Marks, a court does not “ask
whether a single rule of decision has the express support of at least [a majority of] Justices.”124 Instead, there are two understandings of how the
Marks rule works.125 The first, which would seem to be the majority rule,
gives precedential value to whichever opinion is narrowest. As one scholar
wrote:
Freeman v. United States is the most striking example [of
an application of the Marks rule]. After the Court divided
4-to-1-to-4 on an important question of federal sentencing
that affected thousands of criminal defendants, most courts
See generally State v. Gustafson, 359 N.W.2d 920 (Wis. 1985) (per curiam).
430 U.S. 188 (1977).
123 Id. at 193 (omission in original) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15
(1976) (plurality)).
124 Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1942, 1944 (2019).
125
Ryan C. William, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and Precedential Constraint,
69 STAN. L. REV. 795, 798–99 (2017).
121
122
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applying Marks concluded that Justice Sotomayor’s solo
concurrence in the judgment should control. Yet the other
eight Justices in Freeman thoroughly criticized Justice Sotomayor’s position as “erroneous” and “arbitrary.” Bizarrely, the Court’s least popular view became law . . . .126
The other approach, according to the D.C. Circuit, searches for a
“common denominator of the Court’s reasoning” that “must embody a position implicitly approved by at least five Justices who support the judgment.”127
Some state courts use the Marks rule,128 but the Wisconsin Supreme Court has never applied the Marks rule to interpret Wisconsin case
law.129 Instead, the law in Wisconsin appears to be “that a majority of the
participating judges must have agreed on a particular point for it to be considered the opinion of the court.”130 For example, in Outlaw, the lead opinion was joined by three justices.131 Outlaw also included two concurrences,
each joined by the four remaining justices. One of the concurrences disagreed with a conclusion in the lead opinion, believing it went too far. In
State v. Dowe,132 the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed a case where the
circuit court applied the rule from the lead opinion in Outlaw that a concurrence suggested was incorrect. Dowe explained that the lead opinion was
binding only as to the issues on which four justices agreed; for other issues,
in particular the one that had been addressed by the circuit court, the concurrences were binding.133 Notably, one similarity between the Marks rule
and Wisconsin practice seems to be that the conclusions of law in dissenting opinions are not to be considered.134
Re, supra note 124, at 1944–45.
United States v. Epps, 707 F.3d 337, 348 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting King v. Palmer, 950
F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc)).
128 Re, supra note 124, at 1961.
129 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, on numerous occasions, has applied the Marks rule but
only in the context of interpreting U.S. Supreme Court precedent. See Vincent v. Voight, 614
N.W.2d 388, 406 n.18 (Wis. 2000) (“We have adopted the United States Supreme Court’s treatment of plurality opinions in applying the holdings of that Court.”).
130 State v. Fitzgerald, 538 N.W.2d 249, 250 (Wis. 1995) (per curiam) (citing State v. Dowe,
352 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Wis. 1984) (per curiam)) (emphasis added).
131 321 N.W.2d 145 (Wis. 1982) (lead).
132 352 N.W.2d 660 (Wis. 1984) (per curiam).
133 Id. at 662.
134 Piper v. Jones Dairy Farm, 940 N.W.2d 701, 708 (Wis. 2020) (citing State v. Griep, 863
N.W.2d 567, 579 n.16 (Wis. 2015); State v. Coffee, 937 N.W.2d 627, 662 n.1 (Wis. 2020) (A.W.
Bradley, J., dissenting)). Notably, most scholars agree that dissenting opinions should not be
considered when determining the precedential value of a decision; however, one has recently
challenged that assertion. See Varsava, supra note 57.
126
127
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court has squabbled about the adoption of
a Marks rule and has appeared to reject it. For example, in Estate of Makos
v. Wisconsin Masons Health Care Fund,135 Justice Donald Steinmetz authored a lead opinion. Justice William Bablitch authored a concurring
opinion, which was joined by Justice Jon Wilcox. Justice Bablitch’s concurrence stated, “I join the mandate of the lead opinion but not its rationale.”136 Justice N. Patrick Crooks also authored a concurrence. He
seemed to agree with the holding set forth in the lead opinion.137 Two
weeks later, the court stated in another case that “none of [Makos] has any
precedential value.”138 Marks was never mentioned. In a subsequent case,
Tomczak v. Bailey,139 one concurring justice wanted to apply the Marks rule
to Makos and another did not.140
Members of the Wisconsin bar are generally under the impression
that Wisconsin has no Marks rule.141 For the time being, that understanding matches reality. As Justice Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley wrote, “[a]re lead opinions in this court comparable to plurality opinions in the United States Supreme Court? Apparently, the court of appeals
considers a plurality decision of this court persuasive but does not always
consider it binding.”142 Notably, in an earlier concurrence, then-Chief Justice Abrahamson stated, “[t]his court has followed Marks in applying plurality opinions of the United States Supreme Court and in applying plurality decisions of this court.”143 However, a cite-check of this assertion
proves that it is incorrect. The writing cites three opinions; in two of them,
the Marks rule was applied to interpret U.S. Supreme Court precedent. The
only opinion cited where the Marks rule was applied to a Wisconsin case

135 564 N.W.2d 662 (Wis. 1997) (lead), overruled by Aicher ex rel. LaBarge v. Wis. Patients
Compensation Fund, 613 N.W.2d 849 (Wis. 2000).
136 Id. at 59 (Bablitch, J., concurring).
137 Id. at 67 (Crooks, J., concurring).
138 Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 565 N.W.2d 94, 102 n.11 (Wis. 1997).
139 578 N.W.2d 166 (Wis. 1998).
140 Compare id. at 182–83 (Crooks, J., concurring) (asserting Makos had precedential value
because he would apply the Marks rule), with id. at 181 (Geske, J., concurring) (asserting Makos
had no precedential value).
141 Philip C. Babler, The Need for a Marks Rule in Wisconsin, FOLEY: WIS. APPELLATE L.
(Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2018/11/need-for-marks-rule-inwisconsin; Scotus May Clarify Rules for Interpreting Plurality Decisions, ON POINT: WIS. STATE
PUB. DEFENDER (Dec. 14, 2017), http://www.wisconsinappeals.net/on-point-by-the-wisconsinstate-public-defender/scotus-may-clarify-rules-for-interpreting-plurality-decisions/.
142 State v. Lynch, 371 Wis. 2d 1, 77 (Wis. 2016) (Abrahamson & A.W. Bradley, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
143 State v. Deadwiller, 834 N.W.2d 362, 379 (Wis. 2013) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
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was a concurrence in Tomczak, where the use of the Marks rule was disputed.144
Even if the Wisconsin Supreme Court were to adopt the Marks
rule, lead opinions would still prove problematic. This is because a lead
opinion often lacks a common legal rationale with other writings.145 To
give an example, Koschkee v. Taylor146 overturned Coyne v. Walker.147 As
Koschkee noted:
[O]ur mandate in Coyne arises from a lead opinion, joined
by one justice, a two-justice concurrence, and a one-justice
concurrence. When we are asked to overturn one of our
prior decisions, lead opinions that have no common legal
rationale with their concurrences are troublesome. For example, we cannot analyze whether “[c]hanges or developments in the law have undermined the rationale behind a
decision,” if there is no “rationale” to analyze. We are in
such a circumstance in the matter now before us. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude that an
independent analysis of the issues presented herein better
serves the interests of the public.148
Of course, Wisconsin could adopt the version of the Marks rule
that considers the narrowest opinion binding, with no need to analyze the
writings for a common rationale. However, that would arguably encourage
justices to write separately, and narrowly, with hopes that their view becomes binding.149 Furthermore, that version of the Marks rule has been
considered problematic because it has permitted bizarre legal views to become precedent.150 Rather than adopt a version of the Marks rule, the better solution is to minimize the number of lead and majority/lead opinions.

Id. (citing Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 406 n.18 (Wis. 2000); Lounge Mgmt.,
Ltd. v. Town of Trenton, 580 N.W.2d 156, 160 (Wis. 1998); Tomczak, 578 N.W.2d at 182–83
(Crooks, J. concurring)).
145 Koschkee v. Taylor, 929 N.W.2d 600, 604 n.5 (Wis. 2019).
146 929 N.W.2d 600 (Wis. 2019).
147 368 Wis. 2d 444 (Wis. 2016), overruled by Koschee, 929 N.W.2d 600.
148 Koschkee, 929 N.W.2d at 604 n.5 (internal citation omitted).
149
See Re, supra note 124, at 2000.
150 Id. at 1944–45.
144
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B.

A Failure of the Law-Developing Function

Evidently, lead and majority/lead opinions are the antithesis of
law-development. Members of the Wisconsin bar dislike them.151 And, no
doubt, they and the public at-large are growing increasingly frustrated with
the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Lead and majority/lead opinions are at odds
with the law-developing function of the court for at least two reasons.
First, they result in the court declaring less law. Second, they are confusing, and confusing jurisprudence—even when it garners a majority—does
little to develop the law.
1.

Less Law

The Wisconsin Supreme Court is a law-developing—not an errorcorrecting—court. As one law review article explained:
Appellate courts have two primary functions: “error correction” to ensure that law is interpreted correctly and consistently and “law making” to provide a means for the development of law through their decisions and explanations
of decisions. In states with only one appellate court, that
one court must perform both functions. In states with two
levels of appellate courts, the intermediate appellate court
is often assigned the error-correcting role and the court of
last resort, most often called the supreme court, is primarily concerned with the development and declaration of
law.152
One of the reasons states have created intermediate appellate courts
is to allow state supreme courts to focus on a limited number of cases and
thereby improve the quality of their opinions.153 Indeed, many may not realize that state intermediate appellate courts are a recent phenomenon
See Jeffrey A. Mandell & Barbara A. Neider, Sea Change: No More Great Weight Deference
to
Administrative
Agencies,
WIS.
LAW.,
July
2018,
https://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/InsideTrack/Pages/Article.aspx?Volume=10&Issue=1
2&ArticleID=26460 (“The result of these fractured opinions is that most of the analysis in the
lead opinion lacks enough support to be considered law and to provide clear guidance to agencies,
private parties, and lower courts.”); Michael B. Brennan, Guest Post: Forbush and the Riddle of a
Fragmented Court, ON POINT: WIS. STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER (May 24, 2011),
http://www.wisconsinappeals.net/on-point-by-the-wisconsin-state-public-defender/guest-postforbush-and-the-riddle-of-a-fragmented-court/.
152
Flango supra note 13, at 105.
153 Id.
151
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brought about in part because state supreme courts had excessive caseloads.154 For example, in 1978, Wisconsin, following the lead of several
other states, established an intermediate appellate court, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals. The intent was to reduce the caseload bogging down the
Wisconsin Supreme Court.155 As one student comment wrote shortly after
the adoption, “Supreme Court case selection—coupled with intermediate
appellate courts which hear all trial court appeals as of right—has long
been seen as a solution to the problem of delayed or nonreflective high
court decisions caused by increasing appellate caseloads.”156 To summarize
the caseload problem:
In the 1962 term, there were 331 filings with the supreme
court. In 1971, the number grew to 765 filings. The supreme court disposed of 291 cases in the 1962 term compared with 431 in the 1971 term. More importantly, the
number of unfinished cases carried over into the next term
rose from forty in 1962 to 335 in 1971.157
Clearly, justices of the Wisconsin Supreme Court bore a heavy
burden.158 A report to the governor indicated concern that the quality of
judicial opinions was suffering.159 It stated:
[T]o describe the increasing appellate court backlog is
merely to state the most obvious, but perhaps not the most
important, deficiency of our appellate system. In the rush
to cope with its increasing calendar, the Supreme Court
must invariably sacrifice quality for quantity. Increasing
appellate backlogs necessarily produce a dilution in
craftsmanship. . . . The Supreme Court is cast in the role
of a “case-deciding court”—one which merely reacts to the
individual cases and thus slights its law-stating function. . . . The size of this caseload can only have a detrimental effect on the quality of the Supreme Court’s work.
154 Gary C. Karch, Comment, Petitions for Review by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1979
WIS. L. REV. 1176, 1176; see also Matthew E. Garbys, Comment, A Shift in the Bottleneck: The
Appellate Caseload Problem Twenty Years After the Creation of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals,
1998 WIS. L. REV. 1547.
155 Karch, supra note 154, at 1176.
156 Id. at 1178.
157 Garbys, supra note 154, at 1548.
158 Id.
159
CITIZENS STUDY COMM. ON JUDICIAL ORG., REPORT TO GOVERNOR PATRICK J. LUCEY
78 (1973).
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Cases involving major questions of substantive law may be
decided on the basis of superficial issues.160

In summary, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals was created so that
the Wisconsin Supreme Court could focus on its law-developing function.161
Wisconsin’s court reform was part of a nationwide movement that
viewed state supreme courts as law-developing institutions. As a group of
scholars wrote in 1978, the changing structure of state appellate courts
“suggested an emerging societal consensus that state supreme courts should
not be passive, reactive bodies, which simply applied ‘the law’ to correct
‘errors’ or miscarriages of justice in individual cases, but that these courts
should be policy-makers and, at least in some cases, legal innovators.”162
No longer were state supreme courts to hear cases for the sole purpose of
correcting error; as one American Bar Association document stated, the
“lawmaking function of appellate courts” became clearly recognized.163
The rise in lead and majority/lead opinions at the Wisconsin Supreme Court indicates that the Wisconsin Supreme Court is not developing
as much law; instead, it is operating like the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
A lead opinion resolves the issue for the parties, but it provides little guidance to future litigants. In some ways, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
become a very expensive trial court, and the purpose of court reform in the
1970s was to prevent such a tragedy from occurring.
2.

Confusing Law

Furthermore, lead and majority/lead opinions are confusing. Even
if Wisconsin were to adopt a version of the Marks rule, such that fractured
opinions could technically constitute precedent, the precedent that relied on
the Marks rule would lack clarity. Much has been written about the confusion caused by plurality opinions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court.164 A
group of scholars, writing under the pseudonym “Berkolow,” has stated
that plurality opinions strike at the very heart of precedent. As they argue:

Id.
Garbys, supra note 154, at 1548.
162 Robert A. Kagan et al., The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 MICH. L. REV. 961,
983 (1978).
163 ROBERT LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS, 1–2, 5–6
(Am. B. Found. 1976).
164
Berkolow, Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride and Precedent Amidst the Cacophony of
Concurrences, and Re-Percolation After Rapanos, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 299 (2008).
160
161
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Throughout the historical development of the rule of law,
there has been sensitivity to the law’s role in securing predictability, stability, confirmation of investment-backed
expectations, as well as confidence in the enforceability of
transactions, transferability, transparency, and trustworthiness. None of these things, however, could exist without
confidence in precedent.165
Plurality opinions, “[q]uite often (and increasingly)” force the public to “navigate the confusing cacophony that results to identify what constitutes controlling precedent.”166 Stated otherwise, “[c]onflicts created by
concurrences and pluralities in court decisions may be the epitome of confusion in law and lower court interpretation.”167
The rise in majority/lead opinions has caused further confusion:
identifying what portions of an opinion are precedential. Before the 2019–
20 term, readers of Wisconsin Supreme Court opinions had to search footnotes in opinions to determine what portions were joined by what justices.
For example, in Tetra Tech, a footnote in the first opinion states:
Justice Rebecca Bradley joins the opinion in toto. Chief
Justice Roggensack joins Sections I., II.A.1., II.A.2.,
II.A.6. as limited in Justice Gableman’s concurrence, II.B.
and III. Justice Gableman joins Paragraphs 1–3, Sections
I. II. (introduction), II.A. (introduction), II.A.1., II.A.2.,
II.A.6., IIB., and III., and the mandate, although he does
not join Section II.A.6. to the extent that the first sentence
of Paragraph 84 implies a holding on constitutional
grounds. Therefore, this opinion announces the opinion of
the court with respect to Sections I., II.A.1., II.A.2., II.B.,
and III.168
This practice stood in sharp contrast to the practice of some courts,
such as the U.S. Supreme Court, which put a designation block at the beginning of the opinion. Particularly if someone is reading on Lexis or
Westlaw, where footnotes appear at the end of the opinion, the reader is unlikely to realize that portions of the opinion are not precedent. Indeed, arti-

Id. at 301.
Id.
167 Id. at 300.
168
Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, 914 N.W.2d 21, 29 n.4 (Wis. 2018) (majority/lead).
165
166
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cles about Tetra Tech dedicated substantial space to simply telling readers
what portions of Tetra Tech were joined by what justices.169
The bar should not have to spend so much time identifying what
portions of an opinion are precedent. For this reason, in the 2019–20 term,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted new practice: designation blocks. It
adopted this practice from the U.S. Supreme Court, which has long utilized
it. Table 2 provides majority/lead opinions from the term and their respective designation blocks.

169

Mandell & Neider, supra note 153.
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Table 2: Decisions with Lead/Majority Opinions During the 2019–20 Term
Case
State v. Lopez

Marathon County v. D.K.

State v. Coffee II

State v. Muth

Explanation
ZIEGLER, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ROGGENSACK, C.J., KELLY, and HAGEDORN, JJ.,
joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KELLY, J., joined in part. KELLY, J.,
filed a concurring opinion. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which DALLET, J., joined.
ZIEGLER, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court
with respect to Parts I., II., III., IV.A., IV.B., and IV.C.1, in
which ROGGENSACK, C.J., REBECCA GRASSL
BRADLEY, KELLY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, the majority opinion of the Court with respect to Part V., in which
ROGGENSACK, C.J., KELLY and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined,
and an opinion with respect to Parts IV.C.2., and IV.D., in
which ROGGENSACK, C.J., and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined.
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KELLY, J., joined. DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined.
ZIEGLER, J., announced the mandate of the Court and delivered the majority opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I,
II, III, and IV.C. and D., in which ROGGENSACK, C.J.,
KELLY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. KELLY, J., filed a
concurring opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL
BRADLEY, J., joined ¶¶59-63. ANN WALSH BRADLEY,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL
BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined.
ROGGENSACK, C.J., announced the mandate of the Court,
and delivered an opinion, in which ZIEGLER, J., joined as to
Parts II.A, B. and D., except for ¶¶58–60, and in which
KELLY, J., joined as to Parts II.A, B., and D. DALLET, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, in which ANN WALSH
BRADLEY and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ.,
joined, and in which ZIELGER, J., joined as to ¶¶63–70 and
¶¶72–78. KELLY, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, in which HAGEDORN, J., joined as to
Parts I. and II. HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

The designation blocks are an improvement, but there are still
problems. First, if the wording is not precise, the designation blocks could
be wrong. A fair reading of the designation block in Coffee II—indeed, the
best reading—indicates that Chief Justice Roggensack and Justice Hagedorn did not join the entirety of the majority/lead opinion. However,
whether they intended to join only a portion of the opinion is unclear.
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Second, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has not adopted consistent
language. As already explained, members of the court have not settled on
the terminology to use. For example, the designation block in Lopez says,
“ZIEGLER, J., delivered a majority opinion.” However, parts of the opinion did not have a majority.170 Therefore, the designation block may do
more harm than good. A quick reader on Lexis or Westlaw could mistakenly cite portions of Lopez as binding precedent, and the reader’s mistake
would be forgivable because the opinion designation block suggests as
much.
Third, the opinion designation blocks are difficult to discern. For
example, Justice Ziegler joined parts of the lead opinion in Muth: “Parts
II.A, B. and D., except for ¶¶58–60.” Ideally, readers should be able to focus on the reasoning of an opinion without questioning whether small portions of it are binding. Notably, other jurisdictions appear to have a similar
problem with labeling opinions. A recent student comment in the Washington Law Review lamented:
Almost 10% of the Washington State Supreme Court’s
2018 decisions were fragmented. Despite lacking a clear
majority opinion, Washington courts still afford precedential value to parts of these fragmented decisions. Actually
determining what precedential value these decisions have,
however, is a complicated endeavor. The result is that
many misinterpret how these cases will apply to a lower
court.
Many misinterpret these cases because of the way that the
Court labels its fragmented decisions. While the Court labels one opinion as the lead opinion in its fragmented decisions, this label is misleading: the lead opinion does not
always garner a plurality of the justices’ votes, might not
express the actual outcome of the case, and might not include any of the reasoning that the court used to arrive at
the judgment.171
The labelling issue in Washington appears to be even more complicated because, according to the comment, “[t]he [Washington Supreme]

170 State v. Lopez, 936 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Wis. 2019) (Bradley, R., J., concurring); id. at 136
(Kelly, J., concurring).
171
Rachael Clark, Comment, Piecing Together Precedent: Fragmented Decisions from the
Washington State Supreme Court, 94 WASH. L. REV. 1989, 1991 (2019).
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Court extracts precedential value from a fragmented decision when there is
any single point of reasoning that at least five [of nine] justices agree with,
regardless of whether they concur or dissent in the judgment.”172 As already noted, Wisconsin courts do not consider the statements of justices in
the dissent for counting purposes.
Evidently, lead and majority/lead opinions are difficult to label,
and that in and of itself is a problem.
C.

Problems for Conservatives

In addition to confusing the law, lead and majority/lead opinions—
at least in Wisconsin—are disproportionately a problem for conservatives.
If conservatives cannot learn to compromise the way that liberals have,
they always will be at a disadvantage in a common law jurisdiction where
precedent plays a key role. Additionally, conservatives at the Wisconsin
Supreme Court have long opposed minority vote pooling; however, it is
unclear how much longer they can fend off requests for minority vote pooling if the court remains fractured.
1.

Conservative Jurisprudence’s Disadvantage

For context, much has been written about how justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court vote in blocs. Interestingly, conservative justices struggle
to maintain bloc cohesion while liberal justices do not. Ilya Shapiro of the
Cato Institute, wrote: “[O]f the 20 cases [during the 2018 term] where the
court split 5-4, only seven had the ‘expected’ ideological divide of conservatives over liberals. By the end of the term, each conservative justice
had joined the liberals as the deciding vote at least once.”173 He concluded:
“[I]f lockstep voting and a results-driven court concerns us, it isn’t the conservatives we should be worried about. While senators, journalists, and academics love decrying the Roberts Five, it’s the (Ruth Bader) Ginsburg
Four that represent a bloc geared toward progressive policy outcomes.”174
Other experts have made similar observations. Merrill Matthews, a
resident scholar at the Institute for Policy Innovation, noted:

Id. at 1992.
Ilya Shapiro, Liberal Supreme Court Justices Vote in Lockstep, Not the Conservative Justices, CATO INSTITUTE (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/liberalsupreme-court-justices-vote-in-lockstep-not-the-conservative-justices.
174 Id.
172
173
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[W]hen the issue before the court has a clear ideological or
partisan divide, the four liberals march in lockstep. It’s
one of the court’s conservatives who provides the fifth vote
to give liberals a victory. . . .
The irony in all this is that when Senate Democrats grill a
Republican Supreme Court nominee, they scathingly predict the nominee will be closed minded and vote along
ideological lines. The truth is that only liberal justices do
that, which is why no liberal justice ever becomes the
swing vote.175

Bloc voting has a negative connotation in the sense that it implies
judges are result-oriented. Perhaps a better way of understanding what is
happening is through the lens of judicial philosophy. Conservatives struggle to compromise, so voting as a bloc is hard.
For the 2019–20 term, the Wisconsin Supreme Court supposedly
had a 5-2 conservative-liberal split.176 If the conservatives were acting as a
bloc, there should be very few lead and majority/lead opinions. But alas,
the anti-consensus building philosophy of some conservatives has produced
a high number of such opinions, and all of them were authored by conservative justices. At least portions of each of these opinions lack the protection of stare decisis.
While liberal justices may write separately in cases where another
liberal justice is the majority author, they are cautious to do so when the result will be that the first opinion no longer has a majority. Less caution ex-

175 Merrill Matthews, Opinion, Liberal Supreme Court Justices Never Wear the ‘Swing Vote’
Mantle, THE HILL (June 23, 2020, 5:30 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/504134-liberalsupreme-court-justices-never-wear-the-swing-vote-mantle; see also Fred Barnes, The Supreme
Court’s Real Bloc Is Liberal, WASH. EXAMINER (Oct. 10, 2019, 11:00 PM),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/columnists/the-supreme-courts-real-bloc-isliberal; Mark Sherman & Jessica Gresko, Roberts’ Supreme Court Defies Easy Political Labels,
AP NEWS (June 28, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/222dd32b7609458f98a811cb00c44848.
176 The labeling of justices is often inappropriate in that it suggests justices actively consider
politics. It can cause substantial harm to the institution. Patience Drake Roggensack, Tough Talk
and the Institutional Legitimacy of Our Courts, MARQ. LAW., Fall 2017, at 45,
https://law.marquette.edu/assets/marquette-lawyers/pdf/marquette-lawyer/2017-fall/2017-fallp45.pdf. Notably, judges in Wisconsin run in non-partisan elections. Moreover, to the extent that
judges can be grouped together, as either conservative or liberal, those groupings may reflect
shared judicial philosophy as opposed to shared politics. See id. at 49; see also Scalia Discusses
His Relationship With John Roberts After ‘Obamacare’, CNN (July 19, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TEt67H4rD9E; Wis. Supreme Court Justice Rebecca Bradley
speaks on oral arguments, briefs and research, TMJ4 NEWS (June 17, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LPOUxajkoW8.
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ists with respect to conservative justices. Remarkably, Justice Ann Walsh
Bradley and Justice Dallet, combined, authored 13 majority opinions during the 2019–20 term; neither authored a single lead opinion. During the
2018–19 term, Justice Abrahamson, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and Justice
Dallet authored 20 majority opinions; none authored a single lead opinion.
During the 2017–18 term, Justice Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh
Bradley authored 16 majority opinions; Justice Abrahamson authored a
single lead opinion.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court is destined to become a liberal
court. Indeed, with the recent spring election, the court has already lost one
member of the supposed conservative bloc: Justice Kelly. When it becomes liberal, the disagreement among conservative justices from the
2015–16 term on will inevitably result in many decisions being disregarded
because they were not majority opinions. The future liberal court will not
even have to consider stare decisis. Liberal justices will simply note—
correctly—that the cases never constituted precedent.
2.

Rehashing “Minority Vote Pooling”

Fractured opinions also lead to calls for minority vote pooling. For
context, minority vote pooling goes by various names, such as “case-bycase adjudication.”177 The gist of the idea is that outcomes are determined
by “pooling” together justices’ votes on different issues. Two New York
University professors gave the following illustration.178
Table 3: Minority Vote Pooling

Justices
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

177
178

Fourth
Amendment
Violated?
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y

Fifth
Amendment
Violated?
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
N

Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 47, at 15.
Id.

New Trial (Outcome)
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
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In the above example, five justices agreed that the Fourth Amendment was not violated. A different five justices agreed that the Fifth
Amendment was not violated. A logical case resolution would be that no
new trial occurs. The scholars called this “issue-by-issue adjudication.”179
But, if the votes of the four justices who believe that the Fourth Amendment was violated are pooled with the votes of the four justices who believe that the Fifth Amendment was violated, the alliance of the two minority positions could change the outcome. Minority vote pooling is deeply
inconsistent with a collegial court. To explain:
In case-by-case adjudication, we picture the Court as expecting each Justice to express a final view on the outcome
of the case, and as then simply counting noses. In issueby-issue adjudication, in contrast, we picture the Court as
expecting an expression of views on each issue, and as discouraging or at least ignoring any references made by the
Justices to their personal view of the outcome, since the
outcome will be a matter of simple doctrinal arithmetic.180
To explain further, minority vote pooling imagines a world in
which the proper resolution of a case is little more than the sum-total of the
individual justices’ subjective views. Recall that judges on a collegial
court are not like judges of a gymnastics competition. A collegial court
acts collectively, not as merely the sum-total of its justices. Using the
above example, the court, collectively, did not conclude that either the
Fourth or the Fifth Amendment was violated. Therefore, the collective decision of the court ought to be that there is no new trial.
To illustrate the problem, imagine that the case had to be remanded
with guidance. What rule of law does the lower court apply? Imagine a
future court attempting to apply the precedent going forward. What do the
judges in that case do? Simply put, minority vote pooling creates a substantial problem. Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court has a tradition—
rejected by some justices, although perhaps they did not realize what they
were doing—of minority vote pooling.181 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
has rejected the practice.182

179
180
181
182

Id. at 11.
Id. at 16.
See generally id.
State v. Gustafson, 359 N.W.2d 920, 922 (1985) (per curiam).
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In 2016, an attorney at a prominent Wisconsin law firm blogged:
“[G]iven the complexity of the issues often presented to the [Wisconsin
Supreme] Court and the apparent fractiousness of the current Court, is it
time to consider reversing the prohibition on minority vote pooling?”183
The attorney continued, “if vote pooling is problematic across the board,
how will the Court proceed, given the frequency with which the Court
seems unable or unwilling to build consensus among a majority?”184 The
attorney raises fair points; however, the conservatives of the Wisconsin Supreme Court have long been concerned with minority vote pooling because
it can lead to “arbitrary and illogical results.”185
For example, consider the recent case of Wisconsin Legislature v.
Palm,186 wherein the Wisconsin Supreme Court struck down most of Wisconsin’s COVID-19 Safer-at-Home order. Chief Justice Roggensack authored the majority opinion, as well as a concurrence. In her concurrence,
she wrote:
We have declared that Emergency Order 28 is invalid
and therefore, unenforceable. Earlier, the Legislature
asked us to issue an injunction but to stay such an injunction for six days, and at oral argument, the Legislature implied that a longer stay may be appropriate if we were to
enjoin Order 28.
Requesting a stay for a requested injunction is a very
unusual request, but we understand that it is driven by the
Legislature’s concern that confusion may result if Order 28
is declared invalid and actions to enforce our declaration
immediately commence. People, businesses and other institutions may not know how to proceed or what is expect
of them.187

Jeffrey A. Mandell, Supreme Court’s Non-Decision in State v. Lynch Raises Questions
About How the Court Does Its Work, STAFFORD ROSENBAUM LLP (July 21, 2016),
https://www.staffordlaw.com/blog/appellate-practice/supreme-courts-non-decision-in-state-vlynch-raises-questions-about-how-th/.
184 Id.
185 Gustafson, 359 N.W.2d at 922.
186
942 N.W.2d 497 (Wis. 2020).
187 Id. at 918 (Roggensack, C.J., concurring).
183
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She went on to state, “although our declaration of rights is effective
immediately, I would stay future actions to enforce our decision until May
20, 2020.”188
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley’s dissent indicated that she and the other two dissenting justices should have been permitted to join Chief Justice
Roggensack to provide a stay.189 But this would have been illogical. The
dissenting justices did not agree that the Safer-at-Home order was illegal;
they completely disagreed with the majority’s reasoning. Unlike Chief Justice Roggensack, who thought a stay might be prudent policy, the three dissenting justices simply disagreed with the majority opinion outright. In essence, they wanted to pool their votes for not striking down the Safer-atHome order with Chief Justice Roggensack’s vote to grant a stay. But
granting a stay is entirely dependent on there being something to stay. If
they were allowed to pool their votes, they would effectively have been
able to block a decision from going into effect solely because they did not
agree with it. A major problem with minority vote pooling is that it gives
justices that agree with very little of the majority substantial power over the
outcome of a particular case and the rule of law going forward.
Table 4 illustrates the vote breakdown in Palm to demonstrate the
attempt at minority vote pooling.
Table 4: Minority Vote Pooling Attempt in Palm

Justices
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Safer-at-Home
Order Unlawful?
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N

If Yes, Stay the
Declaration?
N/A
Y
N
N
N
N/A
N/A

Outcome
No Relief
Relief—Stayed
Relief
Relief
Relief
No Relief
No Relief

As Table 4 makes clear, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley wanted to pool
her minority position—that the order was lawful—with Chief Justice
Roggensack’s minority position—that the declaration should be stayed.
If the Wisconsin Supreme Court continues to be as fractured as it
has been, additional conversations about minority vote pooling are inevitable. This is so because dissenting justices often want control—as demon188
189

Id. at 919.
Id. at 941 (A.W. Bradley, J., dissenting).
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strated by Justice Ann Walsh Bradley’s attempt to stay the declaration in
Palm. A fractured court offers those in dissent the opportunity to suggest
minority vote pooling. For example, after the Wisconsin Supreme Court
decided Coffee II, it received an explicit request for minority vote pooling.
For context, Coffee II involved interpreting Arizona v. Gant.190 Gant states:
“[W]e . . . conclude that circumstances unique to the automobile context
justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”191 Courts are
split on the meaning of this statement. Some have adopted a “categorical
approach.” As the lead opinion in Coffee II summarized, under the categorical approach, a search of a vehicle is justified if the offense of arrest is
the type of offense for which there might be physical evidence.192 In contrast, other courts apply the “reasonableness approach,” which involves ”‘looking at common sense factors and evaluating the totality of the
circumstances’ to determine whether it was reasonable to conclude that evidence of the crime of the arrest might be found within the vehicle.”193
In Coffee II, a two-justice lead opinion interpreted Gant as imposing the reasonableness approach.194 However, the lead opinion concluded
that no violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred because the search
was justified by the totality of the circumstances.195 In contrast, a onejustice concurrence applied the categorical approach and concluded that the
search was justified because the offense of arrest—operating while intoxicated—is a type of offense for which physical evidence might exist.196 The
remaining two justices dissented. They concluded that the reasonableness
approach was correct; however, they did not believe that the totality of the
circumstances justified the search.197 Hence, four justices agreed that the
reasonableness approach was the correct interpretation of Gant. However,
the four were split between the lead and dissent. Importantly, the Court of
Appeals had applied the categorical approach.198 The State Public Defender’s Office filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing:
The court of appeals in a published decision in State v.
Coffee . . . held “as a matter that when an officer lawfully
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arrests a driver for OWI . . . a search of the interior of the
vehicle, including containers therein, is lawful . . . [.]” After granting review four justices of this court rejected the
court of appeals’ declaration and application of a categorical approach to the 4th Amendment issue presented and
ruled that U.S. Supreme Court precedent requires a totality-of-circumstances reasonableness approach. However,
those four justices split two-two on the outcome when applying that standard to the particular facts, with one justice
applying a categorical approach joining the two voting to
affirm the judgment. . . . [T]he rejected categorical legal
standard in the published court of appeals case arguably
remains the law in Wisconsin, though only one justice of
this court so ruled. The court is not asked to reconsider its
analysis or rationale, but rather to reconsider how it characterizes the lead and dissenting opinions and to clarify its
holding on the point of law a four justice majority of this
court resolved.199

In essence, the Public Defenders wanted the Wisconsin Supreme
Court to permit minority vote pooling. The court denied the motion.
Therefore, arguably, lower courts in Wisconsin are bound by the Court of
Appeals decision that applied the categorical approach even though four
justices rejected it. That may be problematic, but it is the price that Wisconsin jurisprudence must pay if the Wisconsin Supreme Court remains
fractured and continues to reject minority vote pooling.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
This Part discusses possible solutions. Rather than fashion a
Marks-like rule or advocate for minority vote pooling, it recommends solutions aimed at reducing the number of lead and majority/lead opinions. To
do otherwise would be to propose solutions that do not go to the heart of
the problem. Some of these solutions are aimed at persuading conservatives to change their judicial philosophy while others are not. This dual
approach is taken because many justices have spent years developing their
judicial philosophy and are unlikely to change.

Motion to Reconsider, No. 2018AP1209-CR, State v. Coffee, 943 N.W.2d 845 (Wis.
2020) (lead).
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Judicial Humility

Judicial humility is often a value associated positively with conservative jurisprudence.200 Broadly defined, judicial humility is “a deep
awareness of the fallibility of human judgment and the risk of error when
met with the difficult, sometimes excruciating, choices that must be made
by a judge.”201 Judicial humility requires a “tempering” of “judicial arrogance,” and it “counsels an openness to hearing the views of others and listening to the wisdom of other authorities and sources.”202 To quote Justice
Kelly, “[t]o err is human, and judges are nothing if not human—especially
when the mellifluousness of ‘your honor’ makes the humility necessary to
recognize mistakes harder to maintain.”203 A humble judge ought to consider seriously the views of his or her colleagues. Arrogance is no doubt
demonstrated when a judge regularly assumes that the views of his or her
colleagues are incorrect.
Unfortunately, judicial humility is often discussed in terms of deference to nearly everyone but a judge’s colleagues. For example, a humble
judge is supposed to pause and seriously consider whether striking down
legislation as unconstitutional is justified.204 This pause comes, partly, out
of respect for a co-equal branch of government, which should not be assumed to have acted unconstitutionally. But, for whatever reason, conservative judges often do not display judicial humility with respect to their
colleagues.
Judges must learn to show a degree of deference to their colleagues. For example, Justice George Sutherland, who was generally considered a conservative, once wrote to his colleagues: “I was inclined the
other way, but I think no one agreed with me. I, therefore, yield my not
very positive views to those of the majority.”205 This statement demonstrates that Justice Sutherland was hesitant to assume that he was right
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when many of his colleagues told him otherwise. His example ought to be
followed. In the words of one scholar:
A Justice engaged in practical reasoning might, after failing to persuade his colleagues of the correctness of his own
initial views, defer to their views as part of his effort to
identify the correct answer on the merits. In brief, his decision to “go along” with his colleagues may signify a humility about his own tentative judgment and an overarching commitment to the process of practical reasoning as an
ongoing enterprise, in light of which individual decisions
matter less than the health of the continuing enterprise as a
whole. In other words, in his view the “rightness” of a decision is, at least in part, grounded in the process and fact
of group agreement.206
To summarize, forming a sincere judgment regarding the meaning
of the law should be viewed as a collegial exercise. Judges should not feel
that their subjective views necessarily obligate them to vote a certain way.
B.

Screws Rule

Judicial humility may require a judge to yield to the views of his or
her colleagues when he or she is not confident in his or her opinion. Occasionally, a judge might be justified in voting against his or her sincerely
held belief so that the court on which he or she sits can act as an institution.
Screws rule, as it has come to be known, may justify a judge voting against
a sincerely held belief to create a mandate or to produce a majority opinion
on an important point of law.
In Screws v. United States,207 the U.S. Supreme Court almost deadlocked. Four justices wanted to remand, three wanted to reverse and one
wanted to affirm. The remaining justice, Wiley Blount Rutledge, also
wanted to affirm, which would have created a 4-3-2 split. The case would
have had no mandate. Justice Rutledge voted with the four justices that
wanted to remand “in order that disposition may be made of this case.”208
Justices have followed his lead in subsequent cases.209 The authority to
206 Evan H. Carninker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97
MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2311 (1999).
207 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
208 Id. at 134 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
209
H. Ron Davidson, The Mechanics of Judicial Vote Switching, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 17,
18 (2004).
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switch a vote to create a mandate has since been called the Screws rule.210
Professor Richard M. Re, who teaches at the UCLA School of Law, has
explained:
Screws itself involved a Justice’s vote to join the judgment
of the Court, not the opinion of the Court. In other words,
Justice Rutledge created a majority on the judgment but
did not join the majority opinion of the Court and so
avoided the creation of precedent under the majority rule.
Perhaps the Screws rule should be limited to votes on the
judgment akin to Justice Rutledge’s, and so should not extend to authorize votes in favor of precedential majority
opinions where the voting Justice disagrees with those
opinions. But that extension is justifiable, for much the
same reasons as the core use of the Screws rule. Compromise majorities can effectuate the Justices’ views of the
law, without unfairly harming a party or violating principles of candor.211
He continued:
One might object that the Screws rule is illegitimate because it authorizes Justices to vote for dispositions that
they believe are legally incorrect. Screws thus implicates,
and arguably contravenes, the essence of judicial obligation: to decide in accordance with law. But that objection
does not grapple with the crisis of legal fidelity that gives
to the problem that the Screws rule means to solve. The
relevant choice is between two plausible but imperfect
means of discharging the oath of office: voting in accord
with one’s views to the detriment of those views’ future
realization, or voting differently from one’s views in order
to realize those views imperfectly.212
To explain further, Professor Re notes that sometimes a justice can
make a relatively minor compromise to achieve precedent that is close to
his or her views.213 If the justice cannot join a “compromise majority,”
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then the result may be much further from the justice’s ideal opinion.214 An
example of such a situation is Coffee II. Arguably, the precedent going
forward is the categorical approach. While the dissenting justices may
have disagreed with the application of the reasonableness approach by the
lead opinion, the rule being the categorical approach seems much further
away from their desired outcome.
Quite interestingly, while Justice Scalia was publicly opposed to
consensus building, one of the best examples of a compromise majority is
Gant, wherein Justice Scalia served as the fifth vote for the majority.215 Indeed, it is the case that Professor Re used to illustrate the concept of a
compromise majority.216 Gant concluded that “[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search . . . .”217
Previous precedent had been interpreted as always permitting police to
search the passenger compartment incident to a lawful arrest of a recent occupant because of concerns for officer safety. Four justices would have retained this reading. Justice Scalia wanted to entirely abandon the officer
safety justification. However, he compromised and joined the majority.
He wrote:
No other Justice . . . shares my view that application of [the
officer safety justification] in this context should be entirely abandoned. It seems to me unacceptable for the Court
to come forth with a 4-to-1-to-4 opinion that leaves the
governing rule uncertain. I am therefore confronted with
the choice of either leaving the current understanding of
[previous precedent] in effect, or acceding to what seems
to me the artificial narrowing of those cases adopted by
Justice STEVENS. The latter, as I have said, does not
provide the degree of certainty I think desirable in this
field; but the former opens the field to what I think are
plainly unconstitutional searches—which is the greater
evil. I therefore join the opinion of the Court.218
Had Justice Scalia not compromised, great confusion would have
resulted. Moreover, whether the officer safety justification, which he so
strongly opposed, would have been reined in, is uncertain. However, he
214
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was able to create precedent closer to what he ultimately believed was correct.219 Similarly, Justice Thomas, who has also publicly opposed consensus building,220 has joined majority opinions for the sake of creating precedent. In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Conception,221 another example discussed
by Professor Re,222 Justice Thomas authored a concurrence, stating:
I think that the Court’s test will often lead to the same outcome as my textual interpretation and that, when possible,
it is important in interpreting statutes to give lower courts
guidance from a majority of the Court . . . . Therefore, although I adhere to my views . . . I reluctantly join the
Court’s opinion.223
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has similarly joined an opinion to
produce a majority. She wrote in one concurrence, “in order that the Court
may adopt a rule, and because I believe the Court’s rule will often lead to
the same outcome as the one I would have adopted, I join the Court’s opinion despite my concerns.”224
Based on the implicit applications of Screws rule by Justice Scalia,
Justice Thomas and Justice O’Connor, two principles can be derived. First,
a justice should employ Screws rule only if the rule utilized by the first
opinion is likely to lead to outcomes similar to those that would be produced by the justice’s preferred rule. Second, the rationale for employing
Screws rule is strongest when the failure to do so will result in jurisprudence that is even further away from the justice’s desired jurisprudence.
C.

Compromise Without a Separate Writing

Screws rule seems to require the judge to disclose, in a separate
writing, that a compromise was made. But notably, justices have compromised without feeling obligated to write separately. There are numerous
examples. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. once sent a private memo to Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger, stating:
It is evident that a Court opinion is not assured if each of
us remains with our first preference votes. . . . As I view
219
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the Nixon case as uniquely requiring a Court opinion, I am
now prepared to defer to the wishes of you, Bill Rehnquist,
and Sandra [O’Connor] and prepare a draft opinion holding that the President has absolute immunity from damage
suit liability.225
Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in one private memo:
I prefer the position taken in the most recent circulation of
my proposed opinion for the Court, but I want very much
to avoid a fractionated Court on this point. . . . If a majority prefers Nino’s [Scalia’s] view, I will adopt it. . . . If
there is some “middle ground” that will attract a majority, I
will even adopt that.226

Compromises on relatively minor points represent a simple, longfollowed unwritten principle: If a court is to ever act institutionally, the majority opinion author must be given some leeway. On complex issues, a
court with seven members (like the Wisconsin Supreme Court) could easily
produce seven different opinions. However, American courts have long
rejected the practice of seriatim opinions.
D.

Reestablishing Dicta

One problem, perhaps unique to Wisconsin, is that the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has abandoned the concept of obiter dictum.227 No sentence in an opinion of the court can be disregarded. That being so, justices
on the Wisconsin Supreme Court may be concerned—and fairly—that
compromising on a relatively minor premise (for example, a single footnote) is problematic. A footnote on a topic unrelated to the case at hand
has every bit the precedential value as the court’s holding.
The reason that the Wisconsin Supreme Court got rid of obiter dictum may well be the reason it should bring it back. The court was concerned that if lower courts could disregard statements in its opinions, “predictability, certainty, and finality” would suffer.228 But if the lack of obiter
dictum is a justification for justices to write separately, whether it results in
clarity is questionable.
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Moving Material that Fails to Garner a Majority to a Separate
Writing

Another way to address the rise in lead and majority/lead opinions
may be for opinion authors to consider authoring two writings. Material in
an opinion that was circulated with the intent of garnering a majority
should be removed and put in a separate writing if it fails to garner the support of a majority. Palm would be an example. As already mentioned,
Chief Justice Roggensack wanted to stay proceedings to enforce the court’s
declaration. There was not a majority. Had she insisted on putting this
content in the first opinion, it likely would have become a majority/lead
opinion. By moving it to a concurrence, she was able to say what she
wanted to without calling into question the legitimacy of the majority opinion by creating a fractured court.
F.

Reducing the Issues Taken Per Case on Review

Generally, the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s practice has been to
grant review on all or many of the issues presented in a case. More issues
may correlate with more lead and majority/lead opinions. This is so because justices may have different approaches for each issue. Some may
want to write separately on one issue while others want to write separately
on another. Furthermore, the overall complexity of a case may hinder the
court’s ability to reach a consensus on any one issue. The result may be
that, instead of the court developing some law on some issues, it develops
no law.
VI. CONCLUSION
To conclude, the rise of lead and majority/lead opinions at the
Wisconsin Supreme Court should be of concern. It represents a demise of
the court’s law-developing function. Chief Justice Roberts has made consensus building at the U.S. Supreme Court a priority. As summarized by
Jeffrey Rosen, a law professor at George Washington University:
[U]nder [Chief Justice Roberts] leadership, the Court issued more consecutive unanimous opinions than at any
other time in recent history. But [Chief Justice] Roberts
was frustrated by the degree to which his colleagues were
inclined to act more like law professors than members of a
collegial court: his first term had ended in what Justice
John Paul Stevens called a “cacophony” of discordant
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voices, with opposing justices addressing each other in unusually personal terms. As a result, [Chief Justice] Roberts
looked to the example of his greatest predecessor—Chief
Justice John Marshall, who served from 1801 to 1835, for
a model of how to rein in a group of unruly prima donnas.
“If the Court in Marshall’s era had issued decisions in important cases the way this Court has over the past thirty
years, we would not have a Supreme Court today of the
sort that we have,” he said. “That suggests that what the
Court’s been doing over the past thirty years has been
eroding, to some extent, the capital that Marshall built up.”
[Chief Justice] Roberts added, “I think the Court is also
ripe for a similar refocus on functioning as an institution,
because if it doesn’t, it’s going to lose its credibility and
legitimacy as an institution.” In particular, [Chief Justice]
Roberts declared, he would make it his priority, as [Chief
Justice] Marshall did, to discourage his colleagues from issuing separate opinions.229

The concern Chief Justice Roberts voiced for the U.S. Supreme
Court is actually more widespread than perhaps even he realized. It is an
aspect, primarily of conservative judicial philosophy, that has found its way
to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. At a minimum, steps must be taken to
address the problem.
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